Changes In Events and Changes In Things by Prior, Arthur N.
CHANGES IN EVENTS 
and 
CHANGES IN THINGS 
by 
A. N. PRIOR 
Professor of Philosophy, University of Manchester 
The Lindley Lecture 
University of Kansas 
1962 
Copyright Department of Philosophy, 
University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas. 
Address inquiries to the Chairman. 
CHANGES IN EVENTS 
and 
CHANGES IN THINGS 
by 
:\ . N. Prior 
THr.: BASIC QUESTIO N to which 1 wish to address myself in this 
lecture is simply the o ld one, Does time really flow or pass? The 
problem, of course, is that genuine flowing or passage is some-
thing which occurs in time, and takes time to occur. If t ime itself 
flows or passes, must there not be some 'super-time' in which it 
does so? Again, whatever flows o r passes does so at some rate, 
but a rate of flow is just the amount of movement in a g iven 
time, so how could there be a rate of flow of time itself? And if 
rimes does not flow at any rate, how can it flow at all? 
A natural first move towards extricating ourselves from these 
perplexities is to adm it that ta lk of the flow or passage of time is 
just a metaphor. Time may be, as Isaac Watts says, like an ever-
rol ling stream, but it isn't really and literally an ever-ro lling 
stream. But bow is it like an ever-rol ling stream? What is the 
li teral truth behind this metaphor? The answer to this is not, at 
ftrst sight, difficu lt. Generally when we make such remarks as 
''Time does fly, doesn't it?-why, it's already the 16th," we mean 
rhat some date or moment which we have been looking forward 
to as future, has ceased to be future and is now present and on 
its way into the past. Or more fundamentally, perhaps, sorne 
future eveut to which we have been looking forward with hope 
or dread is now at last occurring, and soon will have occurred, 
and will have occurred a longer and longer time ago. We might 
say, e.g. "Times does fly-I'm already 47"-that is, my birth is 
already that much past, "and soon I shall be 48," i.e. it will be 
more past still. Suppose we speak about something "becoming 
more past" not only when it moves from the comparatively near 
past to the comparatively distant past, but also when it moves 
from the present to the past, from the future to the present, and 
from the comparatively distant future to the comparatively near 
future. Then whatever is happening, has happened or will hap· 
pen is all the time "becoming more past" in this extended sense; 
and just this is what we mean by the flow or passage of time. 
And if we want to give the rate of this flow or passage, it is 
surely very simple-it takes one exactly a year to get a year older, 
i.e. events become more past at the rate of a year per year, an 
hour per hour, a second per second. 
Does this remove the difficulty? It is far from obvious that 
it does. It's not just that an hour per hour is a queer sort of rate 
-this queerness, I think, has been exaggerated, and I shall say 
more about it in a minute-but the whole idea of events chang-
ing is at first sight a little strange, even if we abandon the 
admittedly figurative description of this change as a movement. 
By and large, to judge by the way that we ordinarily talk, it's 
things that change, and events don't change but happen. Chairs, 
tables, horses, people change-chairs get worn out and then 
mended, tables get dirty and then clean again, horses get tired 
and then refreshed, people learn things and forget them, or are 
happy and then miserable, active and then sleepy, and so on. 
and all these are changes, and chairs, tables, horses and people 
are all what I mean by things as opposed to events. An accident. 
a coronation, a death, a prize giving, are examples of what we'd 
call events, and it does seem unnatural to describe these as 
changing-what these do, one is inclined to say, 'is not to change 
but to happen or occur. 
One of the things that makes us inclined to deny that events 
undergo changes is that events are changes-to say that such and 
such an event has occurred is generally to say that some thing 
has, or some things have, changed in some way. To say, for 
instance, that the retirement of Sir Anthony Eden occurred in 
such and such a year is just to say that Sir Anthony then retired 
and so suffered the change or changes that retirement consists in 
-he had been Prime Minister, and then was not Prime Minister. 
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Sir Anthony's retirement is or was a change concerning Sir 
Anthony; to say that it itself changes or has changed sounds 
queer because it sounds queer to talk of a change changing. 
This queerness, however, is superficial. When we reflect 
further we realize that changes do change, especially if they go 
on for any length of time. (In this case we generally, though 
not always, call the change a process rather than an event, and 
there are other important differences between events and processes 
beside the length of time they take, but these differences are not 
relevant to the present discussion, so I shall ignore them and 
discuss changes generally, events and processes alike). Changes 
do change-a movement, for example, may be slow at first and 
then rapid, a prizegiving or a lecture may be at first dull and after· 
wards interesting, or vice versa, and so on. It would hardly be too 
much to say that modem science began when people became 
accustomed to the idea of changes changing, e.g. to the idea of 
acceleration as opposed to simple motion. I've no doubt the 
ordinary measure of acceleration, so many feet per second per 
second, sounded queer when it was first used, and I think it still 
sounds queer to most students when they first encounter it. 
Ordinary speech is still resistant to it, and indeed to the expres· 
sion of anything in the nature of a comparison of a comparison. 
We are taught at school that "more older," for example, is bad 
English, but why shouldn't I say that I am more older than my 
son than he is than my daughter? And if we have learned to talk 
of an acceleration of a foot per second per second without 
imagining that the second 'second' must somehow be a different 
kind of 'seoond' from the first one-without imagining that if 
motion takes place in ordinary time, acceleration must take place 
in some super-time-can we not accustom ourselves equally to a 
change of "a second per second" without any such imagining? 
Changes do change, then, but this does not leave everything 
quite simple and solved. For there's still something odd about 
the change that we describe figuratively as the flow or passage 
of time-the change from an event's being future to its being 
present, and from its being present to its being more and more 
past. For the other changes in events which I have mentioned 
are ones which go on in the event while it is occurring; for 
example, if a lecture gets duller or a movement faster then this 
is something it does as it goes Otl; but the change from past to 
still further past isn't one that occurs while the event is occurring, 
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for all the. time th!!t an event is occurring it isn't past but present, 
in fact the presentness of an event just is its happening, its occur-
ring, as opposed to its merely having happened or being merely 
about to happen. We might put it this w;ty: the .things that 
change are existing things, and it's while they exist that they 
change, e.g. it's existing men, not non-existent men, that get tired 
and then pick up again; Julius Caesar, for example, isn't now 
getting tired and picking up again, unless the doctrine of immor-
tality is true and he exi$tS now as much as he ever did. And 
such changes as the change in the rate of movement are similarly 
changes that go on in events or processes while they exist, that is, 
while they exist in the only sense in which events and processes 
do exist, namely while they are occurring. But getting more and 
more past seems to be something an event does when it doesn't 
exist, and this seems very queer indeed. 
We may retrace our steps to this point by looking at some of 
the literature of our subject. Professor C. D. Broad, in . the 
second volume of his Examinatio11 of McTaggart's Philosophy, 
says that the ordinary view that an event, say the death of Queen 
Anne, is in the indefinitely distant future and then less and less 
future and then present and then goes into the more and more 
distant past-this ordinary story, Broad says, cannot possibly be 
true because it takes the death of Queen Anne to be at once a 
mere momentary thing and something with an indefinitely long 
history. We can make a first answer to this by distinguishing 
between the history that an event has, and the bit of history that 
it is. The bit of history that Queen Anne's death is, or was, .is a 
very very short bit, but that doesn't prevent the history that it has 
from being indefinitely long. Queen Anne's death is part of the 
history of Queen Anne, and a very short part of it; what is long 
is not this part of the history of Queen Anne, but rather the 
history of this part of her history-the history of this part of 
her history is that first it was future, then it was present, and 
so on, and this can be a long history even if the bit of history that 
it is the history of is very short. There is not, therefore, the flat 
contradiction that Broad suggests here. There is, however, the 
difficulty that we generally think of the history of a thing as the 
sum of what it does and what happens to it while it is there-
when it ceases to be, its history has ended-and this does make 
lt. seem odd that there should be an indefinitely long history of 
something which itself occupies a time which is indefinitely short. 
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But if there is a genuine puzzle here, it concerns what is actu-
ally going on also. For whatever goes on for any length of time 
-and that means: whatever goes on-will have future and past 
phases as well as the immediately present one; its going on is in 
fact a continual passage of one phase after another from being 
future through being present to being past. Augustine's reflec-
tions, in the eleventh chapter of his Confessions, on the notion 
of a "long time," are relevant here. Just when, he asks, is a 
long time long? Is it long when it is present, or when it is past 
or future? We need not, I think, attach much importance to the 
fact that Augustine concentrates on so abstract a thing as a "time" 
or an interval; his problems can be quite easil}' re-stated in terms 
of what goes 011 over the interval; in fact he himself slips into 
this, and talks about his childhood, a future sunrise and so on. 
When, we may ask, does a process go on for a long time--while 
it is going on, or when it lies ahead of us, or is all over? 
Augustine is at first driven to the view that it is when it is 
present that a time is long, for only what i! can be long or short 
(paragraph 18). We can give the same answer with processes-
it is when they are going on that they go on for a long time. But 
then, as Augustine points out, there are these phases. A hundred 
years is a long time, but it's not really present all at once, and 
even if we try to boil down the present to an hour, "that one 
hour passes away in flying particles." "The present hath no 
space" ( 20). Augustine had apparently not heard of the "spe-
cious present," but even if he had it would not have helped him 
much-most of the happenings we are interested in take longer 
than that. He tries out the hypothesis that the past and the 
future, and past and future events, in some sense after all "are" 
-that there is some "secret place" where they exist all the time, 
and from which they come and to \vhich they go. If there is no 
such place, then where do those who foresee the future and recall 
the past, discern these things? "For that which is not, cannot be 
seen" (22). 
Well, Augustine says, he doesn't know anything about that, 
but one thing that he does know is that wherever "time past and 
to come" may "be," "they are not there as future, or past, but 
present. For if there also they be future, they are not yet there: 
if there also they be past, they are no longer there. Wheresoever 
then is whatsoever is, it is only as present" (23). Of course 
th~re are pr~sent ''traces" or images of past things .in our. mem-
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ories, and present signs and intentions on the basis of which we 
make our future forecasts ( 23,24), and sometimes Augustine 
seems satisfied with this-past, present and future, he says "do 
exist in some sort, in the soul, but otherwhere do I not see them" 
( 26) . But sometimes he seems far from content with this-that 
which we remember and anticipate, he says, is different from 
these signs, and is tzot present (23,24)-and, one must surely 
add, is not "in the soul." 
It is time now to be constructive, and as a preparation for 
this I shall indulge in what may seem a digression, on the sub-
ject of Grammar. English philosophers who visit the United 
States are always asked sooner or later whether they are "ana-
lysts." I'm not at all sure what the answer is in my own case, but 
there's another word that Professor Passmore once invented to 
describe some English philosophers who are often called "ana-
lysts," namely the word "grammaticist," and that's something I 
wouldn't at all mind calling myself. I don't deny that there are 
genuine metaphysical problems, but I think you have to talk 
about grammar at least a little bit in order to solve most of them. 
And in particular, I would want to maintain that most of the 
present group of problems about time and change, though not 
quite all of them, arise from the fact that many expressions which 
look like nouns, i.e. names of objects, are not really nouns at all 
but concealed verbs, and many expressions which look like verbs 
are not really verbs but concealed conjunctions and adverbs. 
That is a slight over-simplification, but before we can get it stated 
more accurately we must look more closely at verbs, conjunctions 
and adverbs. 
I shall assume that we are sufficiently clear for our present 
purposes as to what a noun or name is, and what a sentence is; 
and given these notions, we can define a verb or verb-phrase as 
an expression that constructs a sentence out of a name or names. 
For instance, if you tack the verb "died" on the name "Queen 
Anne" you get the sentence "Queen Anne died," and if you tack 
the phrase "is an undertaker" on the name "James Bowels" you 
get the sentence "James Bowels is an undertaker," so that this 
is a verb-phrase. I say "out of a name or names'' because some 
verbs have to have an object as well as a subject. Thus if you put 
the verb "loves" between the names "Richard" and "Joan" you 
get the sentence "Richard loves Joan"; this verb constructs this 
sentence out of these two names; and the phrase "is taller than" 
6 
would function similarly. Logicians call verbs and verb-phrases 
"predicates"; "died" and "is an undertaker" would be "one-
place" predicates, and "loves" and "is taller than" are "two-
place" predicates. There are also expressions which construct 
sentences, not out of names, but out of other sentences. If an 
expression constructs a sentence out of two or more other sen-
tences it is a conjunction, or a phrase equivalent to a conjunc-
tion. For example "Either-or-" functions in this way in 
"'Either it will rain or it will snow." If the expression constructs 
a sentence out of one other sentence it is an adverb or adverbial 
phrase, like "not" or "It is not the case that," or "allegedly" or 
"It is alleged that," or "possibly" or "It is possible that." Thus 
by attaching these expressions to "It is raining" we obtain the 
sentences 
It is not raining. 
It is not the case that it is raining. 
It is allegedly raining. 
It is alleged that it is raining. 
It is possibly raining. 
It is possible that it is raining. 
One very importance difference betwen conjunctions and adverbs 
on the one hand and verbs on the other is that because the former 
construct sentences out of sentences, i.e. the same sort of thing 
as they end up with, they can be applied again and again to 
build up more and more complicated sentences, like "It is 
allegedly possible that he will not come," which could be spread 
out as 
It is said that (it is possible that (it is not the case 
that (he will come))). 
You can also use the same adverb twice and obtain such things 
as double negation, alleged allegations and so on. Verbs, because 
they do not end up with the same sort of expression as what they 
start with, cannot be piled up in this way. Having constructed 
"Queen Anne died" by the verb "died" out of the name "Queen 
Anne," you cannot do it again-"Queen Anne died died" is not 
a sentence. 
Turning now to our main subject, I want to suggest that put-
ting a verb into the past or future tense is exactly the same sort 
of thing as adding an adverb to the sentence. "I was having my 
breakfast" is related to "I am having my breakfast" in exactly 
the same way as "I am allegedly having my breakfast" is related 
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to it, and it is only a historical accident that we generally form 
the past tense by modifying the present tense, e.g. by changing 
"am" to "was," rather than by tacking on an adverb. In a 
rationalised language with uniform constructions for similar func-
tions we could form the past tense by prefixing to a given sen· 
tence the phrase "It was the case that," or "It has been the case 
that" (depending on what sort of past we meant), and the future 
tense by prefixing "It will be the case that:'' For example, instead 
of "I will be eating my breakfast" we could say 
"It will be the case that I am eating my breakfast," 
and instead of "I was eating my breakfast" we could say 
"It was the case that I am eating my breakfast." 
The nearest we get to the latter in ordinary English is "It was 
the case that I was eating my breakfast," but this is one of those 
anomalies like emphatic double negation. The construction I am 
sketching embodies the truth behind Augustine's suggestion of 
the "secret place" where past and future times "are," and his 
insistence that wherever they are, they are not there as past or 
future but as present. The past is not the present but it is the 
past present, and the future is not the present but it is the future 
present. 
There is also, of course, the past future and the future past. 
For these adverbial phrases, like other adverbial phrases, can be 
applied repeatedly-the sentences to which they are attached do 
not have to be simple ones; it is enough that they be sentences. 
and they can be sentences which already have tense-adverbs, as 
we might call them, within them. Hence we can have such a 
construction as 
"It will be the case that (it has been the case that 
(I am taking off my coat))," 
or in plain English, "I will have taken off my coat." We can 
similarly apply repeatedly such specific tense-adverbs as "It was 
the case 48 years ago that." For example, we could have 
"It will be the case 7 months hence that (it was the 
case 48 years ago that (I am being born))," 
that is, it will be my 48th birthday in 7 months' time. 
To say that a change has occurred is to say at least this much: 
that something which was the case formerly is not the case now. 
That is, it is at least to· say that for some sentence p we have 
It was the case that p, and it is not the case that p. 
\.This sentence p can be as complicated as you like, and can itself 
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contain tense-adverbs, so that one example of our formula would 
be 
It was the case 5 months ago that (it was the case 
only 47 years ago that (I am being born) ) , and it is 
not now the case that (it was the case only 47 years 
ago that (I am being born) ) , 
that is, I am not as young as I used to be. This last change, of 
course, is a case of precisely that recession of events into the 
past that we are really talking about when we say that time flows 
or passes, and the piling of time-references on top of one another. 
with no suggestion that the time-words must be used in a different 
sense at each level, simply reflects the fact that tense-adverbs are 
adverbs, not verbs. 
An important point to notice now is that while I have been 
talking about words-for example about verbs and adverbs-
for quite a long time, the sentences that I have been using as 
examples have 1101 been about words but about real things. 
When a sentence is formed out of another sentence or other 
sentences by means of an adverb or conjunction, it is not (tbo!ll 
those other sentences, but about whatever they are themselves 
about. For example, the compound sentence, "Either I will wear 
my cap or I will wear my beret" is not about the sentences "I will 
wear my cap" and "I will wear my beret"; like them, it is about 
me and my headgear, though the information it conveys about 
these is a little less definite than what either of them would con-
vey separately. Similarly, the sentence "It will be the case that I 
am having my tooth out" is not about the sentence "I am having 
my tooth out"; it is about me. A genuine sentence about the 
sentence "I am having my tooth out" would be one stating that 
it contained 6 words and 19 letters, but "It will be the case that 
I am having my tooth out," i.e. "I will be having my tooth out," 
is quite obviously not a sentence of this sort at all. 
Nor is it about some abstract entity named by the clause "that 
I am having my tooth out." It is about me and my tooth, and 
about nothing else whatever. The fact is that it is difficult for 
the human mind to get beyond the simple subject-predicate or 
noun-verb structure, and when a sentence or thought hasn't that 
structure but a more complex one we try in various ways to force 
it into the subject-predicate pattern. We thus invent new modes 
of speech ·in which the subordinate sentences are replaced by 
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noun-phrases and the conjunctions or adverbs by verbs or verb-
phrases. For example, instead of saying 
(a) If you have oranges in your larder you have 
been to the greengrocer's, 
we may say 
(b) Your having oranges in your larder implies 
your having been to the greengrocer's, 
which looks as if it has the same form as "Richard loves Joan" 
except that "Your having oranges in your larder" and "Your 
having been to the grocer" seem to name more abstract objects 
than Richard and Joan, and implying seems a more abstract 
activity than loving. We can rid ourselves of this suggestion if 
we reflect that (b) is nothing more than a paraphrase of (a). 
Similarly, 
(c) It is now 6 years since it was the case that I am 
falling out of a punt, 
could be re-written as 
(d) My falling out of a punt has receded 6 years 
into the past. 
This suggests that something called an event, my falling out of 
a punt, has gone through a performance called receding into the 
past, and moreover has been going through this performance 
even after it has ceased to exist, i.e. after it has stopped happen-
ing. But of course (d) is just a paraphrase of (c), and like (c) 
is not about any objects except me and that punt-there is no 
real reason to believe in the existence either now or 6 years ago 
of a further object called "my falling out of a punt." 
What I am suggesting is that what looks like talk about 
events is really at bottom talk about things, and that what looks 
like talk about changes in events is really just slightly more 
complicated talk about changes in things. This applies both to 
the changes that we say occur in events when they are going on, 
like the change in speed of a movement ("movement" is a faf011 
de parler; there is just the moving car, which moves more quickly 
than it did), and the changes that we say occur in events when 
they are not going on any longer, or not yet, e.g. my birth's 
receding into the past ("birth" is a fafotz de parler-there's just 
me being born, and then getting older) . 
It's not all quite as simple as this, however. This story works 
very well for me and my birth and my fall out of the punt, but 
what about Queen Anne? Does Queen Anne's death getting more 
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past mean that Queen Amze has changed from having died 150 
years ago to having died 151 years ago, or whatever the period 
is?-that she is still "getting older," though in a slightly extended 
sense? The trouble with this, of course, is just that Queen Anne 
doesn't exist now any more than her death does. There are at 
least two different ways in which we might deal with this one. 
We might, in the first place, say that our statement really is 
about Queen Anne (despite the fact that she "is no more"), and 
really is, or at least entails, a statement of the form 
namely 
It was the case that p, and is not now the case that 
p. 
It was the case that it was the case only 150 years 
ago that Queen Anne is dying, and is not now the 
case that it was the case only 150 years ago that 
Queen Anne is dying, 
but we may add that this statement does not record a "change" 
in any natural sense of that word, and certainly not a change in 
Queen Anne. A genuine record of change, we could say, must 
not only be of the form above indicated but must meet certain 
further conditions which we might specify in various ways. And 
we could say that although what is here recorded isn't a change 
in the proper sense, it is like a change in fitting the above form-
ula. The flow of time, we would then say, is merely metaphorical, 
not only because what is meant by it isn't a genuine movement, 
but further because what is meant by it isn't a genuine change; 
but the force of the metaphor can still be explained-we use the 
metaphor because what we call the flow of time does fit the 
above formula. On this view it might be that not only the 
recession of Queen Anne's death but my own growing older will 
not count as a change in the strict sense, though growing older 
is normally accompa11ied by genuine changes, and the phrase 
is commonly extended to cover these--increasing wisdom, bald 
patches and so on. 
But can a statement really be about Queen Anne after she has 
ceased to be? I do not wish to dogmatise about this, but an alter-
native solution is worth mentioning. We might paraphrase 
"Queen Anne has died" as "Once there was a person named 
'Anne; who reigned over England, etc., etc., but there is not now 
any such person." This solution exploits a distinction which we 
may describe as one between general facts and individual facts. 
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That someone has stolen my pencil is a general fact; that John 
Jones has stolen my pencil, if it is a fact at all, is an individual 
fact. It has often been said-for example, it was said by the 
Stoic logicians-that there are no general facts without there 
being the corresponding individual facts. It cannot, for example, 
be the case that "someone" has stolen my pencil, unless it is the 
case that some specific individual-if not John Jones, then some-
body else-has stolen it. And in cases of this sort the principle 
is very plausible, indeed it is obviously true. I have read that 
some of the Schoolmen described the subject of sentences like 
"someone has stolen my pencil" as an hzdlvidmtm vagum, but 
of course this is a makeshift-forcing things into a pattern 
again. There are no "vague individuals," and if a pencil has 
been stolen at all it has been stolen not by a vague individual but 
by some quite definite one, or else by a number of such. There 
are vague statements, however, and vague thoughts, and the 
existence of such statements and thoughts is as much a fact 
about the real world as any other; and when we describe the 
making of such statements and the entertaining of such thoughts, 
we do encounter at least partly general facts to which no wholly 
individual facts correspond. If I allege or believe that someone 
has stolen my pencil, there may be no specific individual with 
respect to whom I allege or believe that he stole my pencil. 
There is aile ged or believed to be an individual who stole it, 
but there is no itzdividrtal who is alleged or believed to have 
stolen it (not even a vague one) . So while it is a fact that I 
allege or believe that someone stole it, there is no fact of the 
form "I allege (or believe) that X stole it." The one fact that 
there is, is no doubt an individual fact in so far as it concerns me, 
but is irreducibly general as far as the thief is concerned. (There 
may indeed be 110 thief-1 am perhaps mistaken about the whole 
thing-but this is another question; our present point is that 
there may be no one who is even said or thought to be a thief, 
though it is said or thought tbat tlm·e is a thief). 
Returning now to Queen Anne, what I am suggesting is that 
the sort of thing that we unquestionably do have with "It is 
said that" and "It is thought that," we also have with "It will 
be the case that" and "It was the .case that." It was the case that 
someone was caJled "Anne," reigned over. England, etc., even 
though there is not notv anyone of who~ it was the case that 
she was c;alled "Anne," reigned over Englar:td, etc. What we 
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must be careful about here is simply getting our prefixes m 
the right order. Just as 
(a) I think that (for some specific X (X stole my 
pencil)) 
does not imply 
so 
(b) For some specific X (I think that (X stole my 
pencil)), 
(c) It was the case that (for some specific X (X is 
called "Anne," reigns over England, etc.)) 
Joes not imply 
(d) For some specific X (it was the case that (X 
is called "Anne," reigns over England, etc)). 
On this view, the fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some 
years is not, in the strict sense of "about," a fact about Queen 
Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything-it is a general 
fact. Or if it is about anything, what it is about is not Queen 
Anne-it is about the earth, maybe, which has rolled around the 
sun so many times since there was a person who was called 
"Anne," reigned over England, etc. (It would then be a partly 
general fact-individual in so far as it concerns the earth, but 
irreducibly general as far as the dead queen is concerned. But if 
there are-as there undoubtedly are-irreducibly partly-general 
facts, could there not be irreducibly wholly-general ones?) Note, 
too, that the fact that this fact is not about Queen Anne, can-
not itself be a fact about Queen Anne-·its statement needs 
rephrasing in some such way as "There is no person who was 
called 'Anne,' etc., and about whom it is a fact that, etc." 
On this view, the recession of Queen Anne's death into the 
further past is quite decidedly not a change in Queen Anne, not 
because we are using "change" in so tight a sense that it is not a 
change at all, but because Queen Anne doesn't herself enter into 
this recession, or indeed, now, into any fact whatever. But the 
recession is still a change or quasi-change in the sense that it fits 
the formula "It was the case that p, but is not now the case that 
p"-this formula continues to express what is common to the 
flow of a literal river on the one hand (where it was the case 
that such-and-such drops were at a certain place, and this is the 
case no longer) and the flow of time on the other. 
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